Eritrean movie documentation about the history of Eritrean Post Stamps by Eritrea TV. Eritrea become 1991 Independent after this the design and printing of post stamps started. More videos of Eri-TV @ www.eritrea-chat.com or www.youtube.com/eritreachat.

Eritrean Historical Archeological Excavation of Adulis – Port by Eri-TV. More videos of Eri-TV @ www.eritrea-chat.com or www.youtube.com/eritreachat.

Eritrean movie documentation: History of Christian Religious Tsaeda Emba with High Quality from Eri-TV.

Eritrean Battle of Afabet against Ethiopian Derg Regime in 1988 by Eri-TV. More videos of Eri-TV @ www.eritrea-chat.com or www.youtube.com/eritreachat.

Eritrean documentation about the history and importance of Netzela during the EPLF struggle with Ethiopian derg regime and Haile Selaisse by Eri-TV. More videos of Eri-TV @ <a href=”http://www.eritrea-chat.com”>www.eritrea-chat.com</a>
or <a href=”http://www.youtube.com/subscription_center?add_user=eritreachat”>www.youtube.com/eritreachat</a>.

Eritrean Hizbawi Ginbar – Kab Mehkaah kesab Metkah – Part 2 by Eri-TV. Interview with Former EPLF fighters Major General Filipos Woldeyohanes, Major General Romodan Awelyay, Major General Teklay Habteselaisse, Brigade General Tzehay Kahsay (Helal), Colonel Mekonen Kahsay, Brigade General Tekle Lebsu (Wedi Lebsu), Brigade General Goytom Mengstu (Chinese), Colonel Abdu Mohamed, Brigade General Haddish Ephrem and Colonel Semere Abraham about War Stragies. More videos of Eri-TV @ www.eritrea-chat.com or www.youtube.com/eritreachat.

Eritrean Hizbawi Ginbar – Kab Mehkaah kesab Metkah – Part 3 by Eri-TV. Interview with Former EPLF fighters Major General Filipos Woldeyohanes, Major General Romodan Awelyay, Major General Teklay Habteselaisse, Brigade General Tzehay Kahsay (Helal), Colonel Mekonen Kahsay, Brigade General Tekle Lebsu (Wedi Lebsu), Brigade General Goytom Mengstu (Chinese), Colonel Abdu Mohamed, Brigade General Haddish Ephrem and Colonel Semere Abraham about War Stragies.More videos of Eri-TV @ www.eritrea-chat.com or www.youtube.com/eritreachat.

Eritrean Hizbawi Ginbar – Kab Mehkaah kesab Metkah – Part 4 by Eri-TV. Interview with Former EPLF fighters Major General Filipos Woldeyohanes, Major General Romodan Awelyay, Major General Teklay Habteselaisse, Brigade General Tzehay Kahsay (Helal), Colonel Mekonen Kahsay, Brigade General Tekle Lebsu (Wedi Lebsu), Brigade General Goytom Mengstu (Chinese), Brigade General Adem Mohamed (Kokol), Colonel Tesfamikael Gebremikael (Wedi Gere), Colonel Afwerki Yemane, Colonel Abdu Mohamed, Brigade General Haddish Ephrem and Colonel Semere Abraham about War Stragies.More videos of Eri-TV @ www.eritrea-chat.com or www.youtube.com/eritreachat.

Eritrean Hizbawi Ginbar – Kab Mehkaah kesab Metkah – Part 5 by Eri-TV. Interview with Former EPLF fighters Major General Filipos Woldeyohanes, Major General Romodan Awelyay, Major General Teklay Habteselaisse, Brigade General Tzehay Kahsay (Helal), Colonel Mekonen Kahsay, Brigade General Tekle Lebsu (Wedi Lebsu), Brigade General Goytom Mengstu (Chinese), Brigade General Adem Mohamed (Kokol), Colonel Tesfamikael Gebremikael (Wedi Gere), Colonel Afwerki Yemane, Colonel Abdu Mohamed, Brigade General Haddish Ephrem and Colonel Semere Abraham about War Stragies.More videos of Eri-TV @ www.eritrea-chat.com or www.youtube.com/eritreachat.

Eritrean documentation about the independence struggle of the Eritrean’s after the 2nd world war. After the Italian colony, Eritrea was ruled by the British empire until the confederation with Ethiopia.

Reason for the UN decision to confederate Eritrea with Ethiopia:

• – Eritrea’s anti imperialistic policy
• – National democracy
• – Self determination

More videos of Eri-TV @ www.eritrea-chat.com or www.youtube.com/eritreachat.

Eritrean Hizbawi Ginbar – Kab Mehkaah kesab Metkah – Part 7 by Eri-TV. Interview with Former EPLF fighters Major General Filipos Woldeyohanes, Major General Romodan Awelyay, Major General Teklay Habteselaisse, Brigade General Tzehay Kahsay (Helal), Colonel Mekonen Kahsay, Brigade General Tekle Lebsu (Wedi Lebsu), Brigade General Goytom Mengstu (Chinese), Brigade General Adem Mohamed (Kokol), Colonel Tesfamikael Gebremikael (Wedi Gere), Colonel Afwerki Yemane, Colonel Abdu Mohamed, Brigade General Haddish Ephrem and Colonel Semere Abraham about War Stragies.More videos of Eri-TV @ www.eritrea-chat.com or www.youtube.com/eritreachat.

Eritrean History of traditional cloth in Eritrean Ethnics by Eri-TV. More videos of Eri-TV @ www.eritrea-chat.com or www.youtube.com/eritreachat.

Eritrean Religion History: Eritrea is endowed with several and different historical and cultural monuments that stand witness to the historical wealth of the nation and its people. Every patch of land has a profound history to narrate and tell; every corner of the country embraces histories within its belly. Eritrea’s population is diverse, reflecting many languages, cultures, religions yet living together with harmony under the umbrella of unity. This unity makes the people even stronger with each passing day. Eritreans are also known for their friendly and generous nature, not to mention their unique trait of hospitality, which has been a trademark characteristic for years.

Eritrea is also endowed with natural and cultural heritages that are appealing and attractive to tourists. Beautiful landscapes in the highlands and lowlands, valleys, mountains, hills, and ridges are awe inspiring to anyone who happened to visit those places. The picturesque landscapes, which are seasonally blanketed by green carpets of grass, flowers and bushes, are indeed breathtaking to the viewers and a soothing sight to the sore eyes.

The cultural relics including remains of houses and household utensils to architectural ruins, tracing their times to ancient human civilizations are found in this very land, spreading in every corner of the country. There are different historical places: the Steles of Metera and Qohaito; the monasteries of Debre Sina, Ham and Debre Bizen; Mariam Dearit; the Liberation Struggle trenches in Nakfa; rock paintings in Karura; ancient ports of Zula and Adulis… the list goes on.

The Anseba Region is home to some of the most prominent historical sites in the country, one of them being the Monastery of Debra Sina.

Situated in the Eritrean highlands, just around 18 kilometers east of the town of Elabered, on the Asmara-Keren road, the Monastery of Debre Sina is a site of pilgrimage by Eritrean Orthodox Tewahdo believers each year in the month of June.

The Debre Sina pilgrimage includes thousands of ordinary Eritrean believers camping for one night in the village of Debra Sina, singing, drumming, chanting and celebrating the Virgin Mary.

The journey from Elabered to Debre Sina is quite an arduous one. One has to climb to the monastery through a steep slope dry weather road; very challenging for buses to go through. It’s common to see cars breaking down along the way.

What is annoying is the fact that when one car breaks down, all the others following it have also to stop and find a way of passing along that narrow and zigzagging road. However, in most parts of the route, the road is so narrow that one car can hardly pass aside the other car, thus the only solution being to wait until the car was repaired. Well, you can guess how exhausting it can be to just wait and wait until the car or bus is fixed.

During the celebration in which I participated I witnessed more than 300 buses and countless smaller cars making their way to the monastery.

Many more pilgrims also go on foot all the 18 kilometers, climbing the hill and carrying their food and drink. Even though the journey is exhausting, they manage to reach their destination safely. The pilgrims do not only come from inside the country many Eritrean from Diaspora also come here to join the pilgrimage.

I also witnessed the generosity of Eritreans. People, I think they were inhabitants of the area, were offering free water and food to those who were climbing on foot. They welcomed these complete strangers to their house for shelter. Some of the inhabitants were also offering Siwa (traditional drink) to anyone who passed by their doors.

When we reached the monastery, everybody was so relieved to reach at the top of the mountain. Finding a parking lot was another difficult mission. After getting off the buses and cars, everyone starts packing and arranging their things, then walk for about a kilometer to the church, call the time carrying our belongings.

Once again, I observed the kindness of the youth and children of that area. They ask you if you need any help and offer their hands to support to carry your belongings. You feel so proud to be part of this harmonious and loving people.

When we reached to our final destination, we could see down to where the buses were parked. There you can’t help but notice how all those buses made out that almost triangular shape of Eritrea. Everybody was happy and cheered with amazement.

The pilgrims were singing praising song all the way the 83 kilometer starting from Asmara. The themes of their songs were God to bless Eritrea, peace to prevail, to have peace and love with one another, the safely to their respective homes and to have a good rainy season. What the mothers were asking St. Mary through their songs all the way were really heart touching and astonishing. Both Muslims and Christians make the pilgrimage to Debre Sina.

The landscape inside the monastery is unbelievable. Every rock you see seems to be carved out by a great architect. The pilgrims continue praying all the way into the night and the net day. Despite the freezing night air, the pilgrims were kept praying and chanting praise hymns.

The older, inner part of the church (which unlike many monasteries in Eritrea is open to both men and women) is hewn from rock and, according to local tradition, is 2100 years old. The troglodyte dwellings of the 60 nuns and priests who live there can be visited.

One of the oldest religious sites in Africa, thought to date from the 6th Century AD, Debre Sina could play a great role in reviving the tourism industry in Eritrea. And for that to happen, we have to work hard towards developing the basic infrastructure and especially the road that leads to the monastery. The Ministry of Tourism has to work relentlessly to guarantee easier and more comfortable accessibility to the place, so as to make it a tourist-luring site.

- Shabait.com

Eritrean movie documentation: Lela – Afar Traditional Bunita and Derder – youtube.com/eritreachat – eritrea-chat.com.

Eritrean History:

by Bethlehem T.

“Women, wronged in one way or another, are given the overwhelming beauty of endurance, the capacity for high or low suffering, for violent feeling absorbed, finally tranquilized, for the radiance of humility, for silence, secrecy, impressive acceptance. Heroines
are, then, heroic.”

Elizabeth Hardwick (1916 – 2007), U.S. writer.

The girl keeps checking her wristwatch now and then. Maybe it is something she ate at a lunch break but her stomach unusually is not at ease. There was this unidentified frightening vibe hovering over her and she felt it in her stomach. She is not one to believe in superstation but something is definitely not right today. She checked her watch once again, only few minutes left to conclude the last class. Something inside her was bugging her to hurry home making her all restless and unfocused in what the teacher has been saying.

The uneasiness was intensifying by the minute. Saved by the bell- the bell of the school rang loudly officially ending the school activities for the day. She need not collect her books as her other classmates were doing for she already has done so in her attempt to reach home quicker. She was already on her way back home with quick and abrupt steps still carrying that uneasiness and dreadful atmosphere with her. One corner to her house and her fear was confirmed, neighbors were running about hither and thither; women wailing, children crying and youngsters running around their face reflecting their pentup anger and contempt that was burning deep inside.
She knew it right there and then. That something terribly wrong has happened. Fear seized her whole body, her heart was beating faster, her knees were going weak and the earth seems to rotate around her. Everything she saw was wobbling; nothing was firm anymore even the high walls of the houses nearby, the asphalt palm trees, images were fading in and out. And for a moment there she thought she was dissolving into something and that something was swallowing her, she tried to open her eyes and stay on her feet but her eyes seem to close on their own accord.
That’s when strong hands seized her and held her firm. Someone was telling her to open her eyes nudging her back to reality. She opened her eyes, it took her a while to remember and recognize her surrounding but she was already in her house, lying in her parent’s bedroom. The comforting scent of her mother’s perfume still lingers but her mother wasn’t there, somebody else was fanning a cold breeze for her.
She tried to get up but the same hands that hold her earlier pushed her down “stay still for a while” said a voice. She recognized his voice; it was her best friend’s elder brother. But she couldn’t stay still even for a while because that sinking feeling she had earlier was still bugging her. Something strange was happening, something unpleasant.
Women were still wailing and children crying and shrieking in fear, men from the neighborhood were swearing and cussing in strained but venomous anger. She jumped out of bed and run out of the house before anyone could stop her.
People were gathered in the verandah, she pushed the crowd aside and saw what they were watching sadly. There lied the body of her mother and her elder brother and younger too, all bloody, cold and very much dead. She blinked thinking she was hallucinating but this was no hallucination.
She shook her head in denial, unable to accept what she was seen. She closed her eyes hoping this is just a very bad dream, a nightmare that she will be able to wake up from. She opened her eyes again and saw her mother’s protective hands in their attempt to protect her youngest son even till the last minute; they were both shot at heart. Her mother has tried to put her hands as a pillow to her son, even in his death she was trying to make him comfortable.
Her older brother was shot right in the head, blood covering his handsome face. She darted her eyes sideways and saw the message, the message the soldiers of the Derg left behind, “this is the fate of everyone who plots against the motherland Ethiopia.”
She still was in shock; she kept telling herself “No, no this is not happening. This is a dream and I have to wake up now.” She swooned again and retreated to unconsciousness.
When she surfaced to reality again, she was all numb from the pain of all the tragedy, tears however were rolling down her cheek. Her eyes were open but she didn’t see anything or anyone around her except that awful sight she witnessed before she swooned. People were gathering around her and they all were saying something to her but she didn’t hear any of it either. All she could hear was her mother bidding her good day when she was leaving to school earlier that day and her brothers’ mischievous laughter.
Pain and misery have numbed her and all she wanted was to die next to her family. She has no one to turn to, her father has joined the armed struggle two years ago and they get some cryptic messages about his wellbeing rarely and her whole family has been massacred because of a crime they didn’t commit, just because their father believed in a great cause and fought for it. Bitter tears filled her eyes and anger consumed her deep down.
Somebody handed her a glass of water “drink this and put something into your belly” said her friend’s mother as she patted her gently in affection. She shook her head in objection. “You need to gather yourself together and be strong” shouted a woman nearby. The woman forced some water into her mouth and brought a tray of food in front of her. She tried to spoon feed her but she was not willing to open her mouth. She has no energy or will to breathe let alone bring herself to chew or swallow. She wanted to cry and cry till she cries herself to death. And in her death she will join her family. She ran inside to her room where she used to share with her brother, she found his pajamas carelessly folded on his bed. She held them so tight and sniffed their scent as if remembering his scent would bring him back. She rocked from side to side crying out loud. “Were you scared little bro? Did you cry in pain? Did it happen quick?” she asked her brother in anguish picturing the whole thing and how her little brother must have acted. “Take me with you, I want to die too” she wailed in distress and complete hopelessness. Someone entered the room but she didn’t bother to see who it was, the same hands that supported her earlier tried to calm her again. But she was beyond consolation and she was crying a river. “Let me die, I want to die” she started to sob. But he spoke to her harshly, “Live, live and show your enemies, what your anger can do, live and avenge your family’s death. Live and show your enemies what their fate would be for conquering our land and murder us at a whim.” Live!” he shouted hoping he will put some sense into her. And strange enough it made sense. What he said made sense and it carried deep meaning than any of the events that happened that day. She looked at him square in the eye as the realization and the weight of his words sink in to her system, as these words register in her mind and heart mixed with her blood and the very being of her.
Of course she should live; live to see these monsters who murdered her whole family and many innocent people vanish from her country, to see her country liberated and freed, to see children laughing and playing in their free land, to see mothers and fathers live without any worry and fear, to live and see youths of her nation enjoy and breathe a liberated air away from tortures and imprisonments.
She should live to bring a liberated Eritrea for Eritrean, an Eritrea where families should gather up on a dining table and share a meal freely and happily. The girl knew that anything worth having is worth fighting for. She knew she shouldn’t just sit down and wait for others to do this job; she knew she has to contribute her share in realizing this dream into reality. She wanted to show those barbarians who massacred her whole family what a determined and driven Eritrean would do, she wanted to show them what their fate would be for conquering and abusing her land too.
And just like that she was appeased and gained her strength back. Parallel to her studies she learned how to act and speak like the villagers from her father’s hometown, because she has to pass the checkpoints of the Derg officers without attracting any attention or interest towards her. In the evenings the brother of her best friend briefed her on the history, purpose and system of the EPLF. He was a member of the underground fighters that helped in disseminating important information to and from the armed forces, he created awareness among the mass and cultivated support, he recruits new members and provide means to go to the fields to join in the armed struggle for independence, as she knew and understood later he was the link man. But nobody suspected him, in fact he has an aura of a person who is aloof of everything around him and doesn’t care what is happening either.

The fight for independence gave her a new hope in life and a reason to pursue life. The man told her to stay in Asmara and fight through underground activities but she won’t listen to it. She wants to raise a weapon, a gun against those who tortured and massacred her people, those
who invaded her country and abused everyone. The girl went to the countryside, to the place where her father was born, masquerading as a resident of that village who is returning to her home after visiting some relatives in Asmara.

She was only seventeen but has shouldered a very big responsibility. Leaving the playful days of her youth behind she embarked a tough journey that demanded her life. Determined she was, and as such she tried her best to pass the checkpoints of the Derg without blowing her cover. The road was bumpy full of ups and downs, the journey was very long and exhausting, the temperature was hot and merciless but she endured it all, thinking this is just a small sacrifice to her eternal purpose. She didn’t complain as most in her age would do, leaving the comfort of the city life behind,
the adventures of her youth years were dear to her yet not as important. She knew deep down that all the sacrifices she made or would make in the future would guarantee freedom and peace for generations to come. Families would not be separated, tortured and massacred when the independence was won and secured and this motivated her, helped her to oversee the discomforts of the road or what awaits ahead. After a long and tedious journey the girl reached her destination.
She released a sigh of relief. Although she wouldn’t admit it she was scared to death every time the bus stopped at the checkpoints.
Now she has reached her father’s hometown she relaxed a bit flexing her muscles and stretching her limbs. She asked one of the villagers standing by for a direction to her grandparents and the woman offered to take her there herself.
Upon reaching the house of her grandparents whom she has met briefly only few times she couldn’t control all the pent-up emotions that were buried inside. She was crying as she announced her arrival to her surprised grandparents and their neighbors. Pain controlled all her system; she couldn’t control her emotions as they rushed all over again. Her grandparents
and everyone else rushed to welcome her but they also knew she was a bearer of a bad news. The death of her family and the cruelty of their death was a shock to her old grandparents but they couldn’t even cry and mourn the death of their beloved ones properly, afraid it might be interpreted otherwise by the officials of the Derg and their sly spies. Village life seemed
much more terrible than the city, everything was done in hush-hush and fear seems to rule firmly. But despite this numbing feeling of fear the people were courageous and contributed their best to the fight for independence this way or the other.
Preparations for her departure were made in secret; she was to leave the village at nightfall with two other youngsters from village whose house was set on fire by the soldiers of the Derg, accused of supporting the ‘wonbedei’ – the rebellious. Her grandmother didn’t shed any tears as she said her farewell but encouraged and motivated her. ‘Only if I could be young like
you, I would fight and eradicate these barbarians out of my land.’
‘Avenge your family’s death’ she whispered to her as unreleased tears threatened to spill out. Saying farewell to her only family
alive was the hardest thing to do. The prospect that she might not see them ever again made the parting such an even unbearable sorrow.
Her grandfather was an old frail man but that moment he sounded a boy in his twentieth as he tried to pass on some techniques he knew on how to handle a gun. Using his cane to demonstrate, he gave her some techniques hoping she will
make a great warrior. They showered her with a rain of blessings, beseeching the heavens to always keep an eye on her.
Through hidden shortcuts and secret paths the girl reached her destination, a destination where she could start her life afresh. For the first time in six months she breathed a sigh of relief in the liberated lands of her country. Sitting on a big rock she stared ahead at the vast land stretched ahead of her, the beautiful land and its friendly peace loving people. She asked out
loud to the vast land ahead of her, ‘Do you know how many people have died for you and how much blood has been shed for you? How mothers are tortured and abused while their children are killed in front of their eyes? Do you realize the sacrifice that has been made for you? The precious lives you have demanded? Just for you!’

 “Manjus!” somebody from her unit called out for her. Manjus meaning kiddo has become to be her nickname among her comrades. She was the youngest in her unit and despite their effort to assign her in a relatively safer place other than the battlefield their effort has been to no avail. She wanted to fight and  nothing, absolutely nothing will stop her. Her determination reflected in everything and anything  she does, and her ultimate determination is to fight in liberating her
country. Her determination has cost her so many punishments but finally they all gave in to her request to join in the fight and that has made her the youngest member of her unit and she was christened ‘Manjus’. Life as a ‘Manjus’ was tough but as the youngest one she was a bit spoiled and she met a lot of brothers and sisters in the absence of her family. The sound of her rich
and deep laughter that has eluded her for a long time was now her  special signature. Her loud hoot of laughter was a contagious and it spread quickly like a rapid fire, any comrade within a radius of her presence and laughter has to laugh without even knowing what she is laughing about. And slowly with the course of time her deep wounds started to heal although they left hideous scars behind. Every now and then she would remember that hatful day where she come running from school only to see her whole family murdered cold bloodily for no crime at all but for being Eritreans.
She remembers how her family didn’t get a proper burial and mourning, she missed her little brother and her mother’s warm,
loving embrace, her older brother’s protectiveness. She might be called a ‘Manjhus’ but when it comes to the battlefield she was a lioness of the jungle. She runs, jumps, fights and roars like a lioness. In a battlefield she is fearless and fearsome and
never wavers in a face of danger. She charges forward with determination and purpose, for the same purpose her father left home leaving his family unprotected, the same purpose her mother and brothers shed their blood, same purpose she left home
and her grandparents, for the same purpose her comrades are paying their life and their blood, for the same reason limbs and eyes were being paid, yeah for the same purpose of liberating Eritrea and its independence.
Manjus was no superwoman she was all flesh and blood, she hurt, cried and agonized. She was shot two times but this didn’t sag her sprit or falter her steps but motivated her even more. Every time she was hospitalized she heard that first sound that opened her eyes and gave her a purpose in life, “Live, live and show your enemies, what your anger can do, live and avenge your family’s death. Live and show your enemies what their fate would be for conquering our land and murder us at a whim.”
Live!” And this will fill her with brand new energy and determination. She was ready to pay her youth, parts of her body, blood and her own life to secure liberation  and freedom so as no other person would come from school to see his/her parents killed with the enemy bullets, so as no family would have to be separated, so as no one would be tortured, imprisoned and killed.
Manjus has dreamt of meeting her father and a life of happiness and peace with him but she didn’t raise her hopes up either. Majus knew how unpredictable life is especially in the fields, life was never sure here, this moment one might be alive and the next he/she is a martyr, a hero and a heroine who have paid their dear life for a great cause. But she never has stopped praying
for the heaven to keep an eye over her father. She wanted to see his face at least once. And one sweet day her prayers were answered and she met her father. Manjus met her father and her best friend’s brother who told her to ‘live’ in the liberated
areas of Eritrea; both fighting for what they believed in. Her father has changed a lot and he seemed to have aged greatly when
compared to the loving and caring father in her memory, but again a lot has happened since they saw each other. She has longed for this day next to the day Eritrea gets liberated from the yoke of colonization. Father and daughter cried in each other’s arm, they cried in sorrow, they cried in happiness and they cried in determination and promise.

by Alemseged Tesfai,

I. Introduction

Two premises or assumptions have governed Ethio-Eritrean relations of the past sixty years. First is the notion carved into the minds of generations of Ethiopians by the Haileselassie regime that Eritrea is, by nature and logic, part of Ethiopia. The well known arguments of a common history, religion and culture is invoked here and Eritrea is defined as Ethiopia’s natural “outlet to the sea”.

The second premise, which is linked to and complements the first, regards Eritrea as economically weak and unviable, such that its very survival totally depends on Ethiopian resources. This line of thinking further depicts Eritrea as an ethnically, linguistically and regionally divided “Italian creation without the makings of a state”….

These two Ethiopian assumptions gained international currency in the 1940′s, when leading Powers like the U.S. and Britain adopted them mainly to satisfy their own strategic needs and led the fledgling UN into passing a resolution federating Eritrea to Ethiopia “under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian crown”.

The people of Eritrea were not consulted in this decision over their fate and, consequently, they spent the next forty years, thirty of these in armed struggle, fighting for independence. When in 1991 the EPLF led a united Eritrean people to their hard-earned freedom from Ethiopian rule, Ethiopia’s fallacious premise that Eritrea forms an “inseparable part and parcel of Ethiopia” was finally defeated.

The economic argument too had, of course, no basis in Eritrean reality. As an Italian colony and a British occupied territory, Eritrea had a developed industrial and infrastructural base. These were systematically dismantled by successive Ethiopian administrations, such that, in the 1950-1960′s, Eritrea became a big source of skilled manpower mainly to Ethiopia, but also to Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Sudan. Most of the Eritreans being expelled from Ethiopia to-day are the migrants of those years. To-day, Eritrea’s natural resource, tourism and services potentials are showing signs of great future and promise.

In 1991, when the TPLF assumed power in Ethiopia, there was every reason to believe that the above mentioned Ethiopian fallacious assumptions would come to a final rest. Indeed, all the pronouncements of the TPLF leadership at the time left no room for doubt or apprehension in Eritrean minds that they were genuine. It appears, however, that there was more to these than met the eye.

In an interview he gave to the American writer, Paul Henze, in March 31 and April 1, 1990, Meles Zenawi, then head of the TPLF, expressed his feelings about post-independence Eritrea. He told him, first, that he did not expect Eritrean unity to hold, once the Derg was expelled from Eritrea. The main reason he gave for this was that Eritrea was a religiously divided nation and that he expected to see internal conflict once the enemy had gone. Second, he also expressed his unreserved preference to see, not an independent Eritrea, but one linked to Ethiopia in a federal arrangement. In explaining this, he told Paul Henze,

“We look at this from the viewpoint of the interests of Tigre, first, and then Ethiopia as a whole. We know that Tigre needs access to the sea and the only way is through Eritrea …. There are many Tigreans in Eritrea ….. They don92t want to be treated as foreigners there … They have the same history. We are worried about Eritrea because we are not sure that differences among different groups can be kept under control”. (Paul B. Henze, Conversations with Meles Zenawi, J3 26/002/92/3 31 March/ 1 April 1990).

The above comments, expressed slightly over a year before Eritrean independence are self-explanatory. Its public declarations notwithstanding, it appears from Meles’s thinking that the TPLF had, itself, never been free from the old fallacies of Ethiopian ruling classes. One exception is that, the TPLF wanted Eritrea, not for Ethiopia as a whole, but, again according to Meles’s own admission, to enhance the interests of Tigrai.

Since the start of the border conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, this hitherto hidden agenda has been consistently coming to the fore in Tigrayan propaganda literature and the utterances of the TPLF leadership. In fact, according to TPLF propaganda, the issue is no longer their allegations that “Eritrea occupied by force, Ethiopian territory at Badme”. It is, rather, Eritrea’s internal political and economic problems, which presumably, is to be “corrected” by the TPLF’s declared war on Eritrea. In short the re-occupation of Eritrea or parts thereof is the real reason for the present conflict.

This paper will try to set the record straight by disproving the fallacy of “the economic argument” and proving, instead, that the border dispute is the direct result of the TPLF’s expansionist policies and disposition. The first part of this paper deals with the most relevant aspects of the post-1991 cooperation agreements between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The second part will narrate, in summary form, the events that led to the border dispute at Badme. These are separate papers, but should be read together so that the real cause of the war may be firmly established.

II. A Commentary on Selected Aspects of Post-1991 Eritrean- Ethiopian Cooperation

A. A Selected Look at the Agreements

1. The Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation between the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) and the State of Eritrea signed in July 1993 is precisely a testimony to the spirit of friendship and cooperation that characterized, at the time, the relationship between the two states, governments and peoples. It foresaw activities of “mutual advantage” in practically every field with the ultimate aim of “gradual evolution of the two economies and societies into a higher level of integration in accordance with “…..the commitment of both countries to bring about regional economic integration and political cooperation” (Art.1).The Agreement further called on the gradual elimination of all trade barriers between the two countries and the harmonization of customs policies, as well as the use by Ethiopia of Assab and Massawa as free ports (Art 4). The free movement of people and the harmonization of immigration laws was also agreed upon (Art.5). Cooperation in the financial and monetary fields (Art. 9); cooperation and consultations in “realizing common objectives” in matters of foreign policy (Art 10); cooperation at the national and regional levels in border areas (Art. 12); ….were all important parts of the Agreement.
2. Subsequent to this, several agreements were signed by respective joint ministerial committees set up in accordance with the July Agreement. One of these dealt with the harmonization of economic policies, signed in September 1993. This is where it was agreed that the Birr continue as a common currency until Eritrea issues its own money (Art. 1). Here too, the agreements were wide-ranging and quite forward-looking. The harmonization of “exchange rate policies….. with the aim of establishing uniform exchange rates” (Art. 1.1.); harmonization of interest rate structures (Art. 1.2.); the creation of common inflation-control mechanisms (1.3); synchronization of policies related to foreign exchange (1.4)…. were all laid down.In the field of trade (Art.3), the free movement of goods and services for local consumption in both countries was agreed upon, with the exception “of those goods in short supply whose movement depends on their supply availability and related trade policies….” (Art. 3.1). Goods imported from third countries were to move freely (Art. 3.2), but there was to be no re-exportation of goods and services originating from one contracting party to a third country. (Art. 3.3).

   In the area of investment, besides the call for joint-investments, there was an agreement, in principle, that national investors of both countries have the same and equal treatment in both countries. (Art.4). Another Protocol Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Planning and Economic Development was signed on 27 September 1993, where the two parties agreed to “endeavour to coordinate planning in social policies and the usage of human, material and financial resources (Art. 2,3); the planning of strategic industries, railway, roads, ports, air transport, major financial institutions….”, including the exchange of “social and economic statistics to coordinate their planning and development endeavours were all important. (Arts. 4,5).

   The Protocol Agreement on the Free Movement of people and Establishment of Residence of 23 September 1993 is another important document. Here, it was agreed that visas would not be required for nationals of both countries to enter or leave Eritrea and Ethiopia. A valid passport or ID card was all that was required (Art.1). Unlimited residence to both nationals was granted without the requirement of work permits (Art. 2). Each country was to “allow citizens of the other to engage in commercial, business and other similar gainful activities in its territory. In furtherance of this objective, each contracting party undertakes to grant no less favourable treatment than that accorded to its own nationals” (Art.3). The only restriction appears in Article 4 where it was provided that “each country reserves the right of refusal to enter or remain in its territory to (sic) any citizen of the other country where it considers the entry or presence of such citizen undesirable.”

Other agreements covered a wide-range of fields of cooperation, but for the purposes of this presentation, the above will suffice.

B. Who Benefited More from the Agreements?

The argument is often heard that the agreements favoured Eritrea more than they did Ethiopia. Let us look at some facts:

1. Ethiopia enjoyed full and unrestricted use of the port of Assab. Assab has been, by agreement and practice, its free port. The Ethiopian Shipping Lines handled its own cargo, paying the Eritrean authorities in Birr, for consignment fees it received in foreign currency. At the same time, the agreements allowed Ethiopia the use of the port of Massawa for its northern regions at negligible fees and payments – a transit charge of only 1.5%. In later years, the Ethiopians were asking that this charge be reduced further. In both of these port cities, but especially in Assab, the rate of employment for Ethiopians was high. In Assab, Ethiopia was privileged to open four schools operating under its own curriculum.
2. The Agreement on air services allowed Ethiopian Airlines to take Eritrea’s quota of IATA flight space and privileges – “the fifth freedom rights” as they are called. Eritrea was a major region for the Airline, and Eritreans were some of its most frequent and faithful passengers.
3. Surface or land transport also worked heavily in favour of Ethiopia, as no embarkation or other charges were levied on Ethiopian trucks running to and from Massawa and Assab. One ought to keep in mind that Eritrea inherited totally dilapidated roads from years of disrepair and destruction by the Derg’s military campaigns. The task of repairing them was entirely Eritrea’s own responsibility.
4. In these three instances, Eritrea’s benefits in financial terms were the various agreed revenues accruing to it from port activities and the fringe benefits thereof. This cannot compare with the privileges of the freedom of access to the ports that Ethiopia was enjoying. Eritrea actually saw the arrangement more as a gesture of friendship and cooperation and as the grounds on which the projected move towards economic integration, currency union…etc., was to proceed. Maintenance of the peace and security of the area was also of prime consideration in this matter.
5. On 3-4 April, 1995, the Joint High Ministerial Commission led by Minister Mahmoud Sherifo of Eritrea and the then Prime Minister Tamrat Layne of Ethiopia met in Asmara to evaluate the 1993 agreements. The Commission “expressed its profound satisfaction on the progress made.” Indeed, in the areas of education, culture, air-line services, telecommunications….. etc., the agreements were assessed to have worked well.

The Commission, however, identified two problem areas – the issue of citizenship and the commodity or trade sector.

C. The Issue of Citizenship

The first case, raised in the joint Political Committee, regarded “a few minor problems in the areas of security and justice. Here, the Commission noted,

“In the area of security, the Ethiopian side presented that the free movement of people has been hampered due to unclarity of ID cards. It also raised the issue that a significant number of Eritreans who have already taken Eritrean Nationality are still carrying Ethiopian passport and are requesting for its renewal.”

The point was actually the result of the divergent policies of the two parties regarding the issue of nationality. Eritrea recognized the dual citizenship of all its citizens living everywhere else in the world. Eritrea automatically accepts as its citizens, those of Eritrean parentage on both or either side. Nationals of other countries may also be granted Eritrean citizenship by law.

Ethiopia does not allow dual citizenship to its nationals; or so it is claimed, for it is hard to believe that all the Ethiopian exiles who have adopted various citizenships are no longer Ethiopian. But, with respect to Eritreans also holding Ethiopian citizenship, the Ethiopian Government had been wavering. On the one hand, the present Ethiopian Government saw them as strong allies in its own struggle against its opposition, but on the other, and for reasons that are becoming clear only after the conflict, it wanted to curb their activities.

Be that as it may, the Ethiopian Government never took any legal steps to put the matter to rest by either asking its citizens of Eritrean origin to drop their Eritrean citizenship and become only Ethiopian, or by allowing them to choose which citizenship they wanted to adopt. Since this was not done, Ethiopians of Eritrean origin continued to consider themselves also as Ethiopian citizens and the Ethiopian Government continued to accept them as such.

This situation did raise some problems, especially in the issuance of licenses in both countries. To put it simply, the Ethiopian side felt that Eritreans in Ethiopia were taking a fairer advantage of the free movement, residence and business agreements and demanded reciprocity in Eritrea. Eritrea insisted that those Eritreans were mostly holders of Ethiopian citizenship. Thousands of Eritreans of Ethiopian origin were enjoying the same rights as Eritreans in Eritrea. The latter had, and still has, no problem recognizing them as Eritreans. The reciprocity, therefore, was already there.

The problem arose when it came to the issuance of new licenses to citizens of one country only wanting to do business in the other. According to the Eritrean side, equality and reciprocity of treatment was needed here.

A great percentage of the tens of thousands of Eritreans who have been expelled from Ethiopia to date, fall under the first category, i.e., they are Ethiopians of Eritrean origin. No similar measure has been taken on any Ethiopian living in Eritrea. Eritreans of Ethiopian origin have full Eritrean citizenship rights and do not even come into question.

D. The Commodity or Trade Sector

This is the sector that showed some signs of incompatibility right from the outset. The agreement of 23-27 September provided for the following:-

• free movement of goods and services between the two countries except those that were short in supply;
• free re-export of goods imported from third countries in accordance with the rules and regulations of the exporting country;
• no re-export to a third party of goods exchanged as export between the two countries;
• introduction of trade and customs procedures to both countries to facilitate trade; and
• transaction between the two countries to be settled in Birr.

Here, the Eritrean side found the restriction on “goods in short supply”, which was an Ethiopian inclusion, difficult to understand and work with, as any product could be so declared at any time, thus hampering free trade movements. The ban on the re-export of the other country’s products was also noted as overly restrictive by Eritrean negotiators, as it left “traders at the mercy of the staff of the customs administration.” Re-exporting products is a common practice of international trade and Ethiopia was the beneficiary of Eritrean re-exports to Ethiopia. Nevertheless, the Eritreans went along with the restriction.

Subsequent agreements in May and November 1994 tried to work around these problems. A memorandum of understanding signed by the two sides on 7 October 1994, indicates that the Ethiopian delegation expressed appreciation for the following measures taken by the Eritrean Government:-

1. ” Goods and commodities originating from Ethiopia will not be subjected to any customs tariff payment, 
2. Ethiopian traders who have valid Ethiopian trade licenses will personally, without going through Eritrean traders, purchase goods and commodities from Eritrea, and
3. One point five percent (1.5%) transit charge (sic) levied on goods and commodities coming through the port of Massawa destined for Ethiopia.
4. There will be no hindrance to border trade activities carried out between our two countries.”In this agreement, it was further stipulated that no additional intermediate and local payments were to be imposed on goods and services traded between the two countries. The setting up of a joint customs committee to oversee this was also agreed upon. The request by the Eritrean delegation for exemption form indirect (sales, excise….) taxes on all locally produced goods and services traded between the two parties was referred by the Ethiopian side for further study. But, both countries agreed that the free movement of goods not be impeded or distracted by the “short supply” limitation.

In spite of all these seemingly genuine attempts at moving towards higher levels of trade cooperation, however, the problems persisted. In its meeting of 3-4 April, 1995, the Joint High Ministerial Commission headed by Eritrean Minister Mahmoud Sherifo and Prime Minister Tamrat Layne of Ethiopia also raised the trade issue. The Eritrean side complained that contrary to the letter and spirit of the free trade agreement, Eritrean products were being made to pay indirect taxes and intermediate payments of various descriptions in every Ethiopian region or Kelil they entered. To this, the Ethiopian response was as follows:-

“The Ethiopian delegation reiterated its position that Indirect Tax levied in Ethiopia is non-discriminatory and thus cannot be lifted.

“It further stated that indirect tax are not considered to be a hindrance to free trade and services in FTA (Free Trade Area). It is an internal tax. Removing or changing these taxes will have serious implications for Ethiopia. It should be understood that changing domestic tax policy on grounds of trade relations will create problems for Ethiopia.

” The Eritrean side reasserted that indirect taxes are trade barriers and must be lifted. It further argued that indirect taxes levied under a policy of import substitution as a protective fiscal measure is a trade barrier and impressed upon the Ethiopian delegation to reconsider its position”.

On the issue of intermediate payments at the Kelil level, the Ethiopian delegation again insisted that the payments would be adjusted or lifted only if they were discriminatory.

These two problems, which eventually developed into major stumbling blocks standing on the way of the attainment of the original vision, had their roots in the divergent directions in economic policy and strategy that the two sides were moving. Eritrea had adopted an outward looking, export and free market-oriented strategy. It saw Ethiopia not as a competitor, but as a partner and ally in the global market. The Ethiopian strategy, as officially expounded, was based on the development of its agricultural potential and the building up of a chiefly agriculture-related industry. Consequently, it was protective of its local products, which it saw as substituting various imports, including those from Eritrea. In other words, for Ethiopian policy-makers, Eritrea was a competitor in their own local markets and not, as the agreements seemed to originally indicate, an ally and a partner.

This difference in policy and practice had the net effect that Ethiopian goods were entering Eritrea with full freedom, whereas Eritrean products were being made to pay both indirect taxes and the embarkation charges and development fees imposed especially by the Tigrai region. This put the competitiveness of Eritrean goods in Ethiopian markets at a disadvantage. The problem does not stop here. Eritrean products were mainly industrial in nature, whose materials and chemicals were paid for from its own foreign currency reserves. Its re-exports to Ethiopia too were always similarly paid for from Eritrean reserves. That all these were exchanged for Birr in Ethiopia was an added disadvantage to Eritrean trade.

Total value of imports from Ethiopia to Eritrea for the years 1995, 1996 and 1997 stood at 146.8, 261.8 and 274.6 million Birr, respectively. Total value of Eritrean exports to Ethiopia for the same years show 259.7, 273.4, 218.2 million Birr. Total value of re-exports from Eritrea to Ethiopia, again for the same years, stood at 94.57, 69.0 and 19.8 million Birr, respectively.

In view of the fact that there was Eritrean foreign currency in almost every item exported or re-exported to Ethiopia, the favourable balance of trade apparent in the 1995 and 1996 figures is deceptive. In any case, these had dropped from 100 million to 10 million in just one year, 1995-1996. We should also note that the value of imports from Ethiopia exceeded those of Eritrean exports by about 60 million Birr in 1997. At the same time, the value of re-exports fell to an all-time low of 19.8 million Birr, a drop of 50 million Birr from that of the preceding year. This was, of course, not accidental as it resulted from Ethiopia’s increasingly protectionist measures and from the stringent controls and harassment of Eritrean traders at the various check-points in Tigrai.

The fact is that, by 1995-1996, the Eritrean side was already realizing that progress in the trade sector was not likely to proceed as intended. Eritreans were being delayed at check-points, goods classified as “export items” were barred form entering Eritrea….. and so Eritrea was, by 1996, already de-escalating its traditional intensive trade practices with Ethiopia and expanding its market alternatives. Hence, another reason for its unfavourable trade balance in 1997.

Considering again the fact that most Eritrean exports and all of its re-exports to Ethiopia involved payments in foreign currency being exchanged for the Birr, Ethiopia’s advantages in the trade sector were significant.

Add to this the use of free port and transport services, the employment of thousands of Ethiopians throughout the country, but especially in Assab and Massawa, and the non-payment by Ethiopian traders of Eritrean indirect taxes and intermediate payments, and the picture will be clearer.

6. The Monetary Arrangement

Eritrea used the Birr until it introduced its own currency, the Nakfa, on November 8, 1998. The relevant provision for this agreement was signed in the Protocol Agreement on Harmonization of Economic Policies on September 1993. It provides as follows:-

Article 1

The Use of the Ethiopian Birr until Eritrea has its own currency.

In so far as a common currency is in use, the Contracting Parties agree:

1. To harmonize exchange rate policies including consideration of pooling of reserves with the aim of establishing uniform exchange rates within the currency area. 

    

2. To harmonize interest rate structures in both countries. 

    

3. To work out a mechanism by which the increase in money stock is consistent with the growth and inflation objectives of the two countries. 

    

4. To work out a scheme to synchronize policies related to foreign exchange surrender requirements, allocation of foreign exchange to importers, capital flows and external debt management. 

We have been hearing and we will yet hear allegations that this arrangement favoured Eritrea more than it did Ethiopia. How a country that uses someone else’s currency can be deemed an exploiter is yet to be convincingly explained. It is like the US feeling raped because its dollar is spread all over the world.

In actual fact, throughout its use of the Birr, Eritrea was a victim of the Ethiopian monetary policy as it had no say in its formulation. Here, again, differences in economic policy between the two states created incongruities in the use of the Birr. On this topic we refer to an Eritrean economist’s expert opinion, that of Dr. Woldai Fitur of the IFC, who says:-

“….it was clearly Ethiopia that benefited more from arrangements concluded between the two countries. For instance, the arrangements in the de facto currency union, which did not allow Eritrea a voice in Ethiopia’s conduct of monetary policy, worked more in favour of Ethiopia. All seigniorage associated with issuing new Birr notes accrued to the National Bank of Ethiopia, while the costs associated with the overvalued exchange rate and unreasonably high interest rates imposed by the Ethiopian Government on the Birr area spilled over to the Eritrean economy, forcing Eritrea to adopt an independent exchange and interest rate structure.

It is important to appreciate that this interest and exchange rate structure was necessitated by the divergent economic (fiscal, monetary, trade, investment, etc.) policies that the two countries have chosen to pursue. Immediately after liberation, Eritrea adopted liberal trade, investment, and financial and foreign exchange regimes. These policies were quite different from those of Ethiopia. Under such circumstances, it behooved Eritrea to issue its own currency and pursue independent interest and exchange regimes for an effective management of its economy. Ethiopians should not have any reason to resent Eritrea’s independent monetary, interest and exchange rate policies. The development of an active black foreign exchange market, which hadn92t existed for decades, was the natural consequence of the distortions by Ethiopia’s foreign exchange policy. The Eritrean Government has in no way contributed to the development of this black market and should not be blamed for it. Moreover, Ethiopia paid in Birr for all Eritrean exports, including re-export of goods imported from third parties in hard currency. In view of this, it was Ethiopia and not Eritrea that benefited more form the de facto currency union. (Eritrea Profile, Vol. 5 No 1, August 15, 1998).

The Nakfa-Birr “controversy” is actually an Ethiopian creation. The accusation leveled on Eritrea by the Ethiopian government and media is that it sought to force upon Ethiopia a Nakfa convertible with the Birr on parity and that it insisted that both currencies circulate freely in both countries. Why the Ethiopians would think such a suggestion, though it was never made, a blasphemy cannot be rationalized. However, the records show that Eritrea never presented such a proposal or suggestion to the Ethiopian government. In March, 1997, the National Bank of Eritrea had entertained the following three points as payment options that “could be considered depending on the level of political commitment for closer cooperation and prospects for accelerated harmonization of economic policies of the two countries”. These options were:

1. a foreign exchange-based payment system, as is the case with the rest of the world; 

    

2. freely convertible Nakfa-Birr payment system in which trade between the two countries could be conducted with or without opening a letter of credit with a bank; and 

    

3. a partial convertibility of Nakfa-Birr system in which trade between the two countries could be conducted only by opening a letter of credit with a bank. (Bank of Eritrea, “Progress Towards the Introduction of Nakfa and the Disposition of the Birr, March 13, 1997, Asmara, Eritrea. P.14.) 

The Bank of Eritrea did not make a secret of its preference for the second option which it saw as “the most appropriate for stimulating rapid expansion of trade and greater economic integration between Eritrea and Ethiopia.” By the “free convertibility” of Nakfa-Birr in this option, it was not suggesting parity or the free circulation of both currencies. It was, rather, to put it in layman’s terms, giving traders in either country the opportunity to agree on the use of the currency of their choice for settlement and to do so through the intermediary of banks in both countries. Any imbalances accruing from such a practice, according to this option, would be settled in foreign currency through the banking systems of Eritrea and Ethiopia. The assumption here, of course, was that the trade would be carried out without resorting to the opening of letters of credit.

In the joint committee meeting of 19 November, eleven days after the Nakfa had been introduced and the new Ethiopian Birr put into effect, the Ethiopian delegation presented the LC option as its final preference except in limited petty-trade. The US dollar was to be the official medium of exchange between the two countries. Later, the Ethiopians stipulated that the border petty-trade was not to exceed the value of 2000 Birr in each instance. The Eritreans felt that the Ethiopian preference was not in the interest of the people of both countries as it would encumber the traditional free flow of goods.

When the Nakfa came into operation, Ethiopian reaction was unexpectedly and astonishingly violent. Holders of that currency were harassed at all Ethiopian points of entry, the Nakfa was confiscated and sometimes torn or burned and the atmosphere of the complete break-down of trade created by Ethiopian authorities. In fact, trade from Eritrea to Ethiopia came to a virtual halt.

Nothing approaching that level of irrationality was seen prior to the Nakfa incident – not even at the time of Eritrean independence, especially by the TPLF cadres and their supporters. Suddenly, pictures of an economically weak Eritrea trying to get an easy ride on the back of Ethiopia started to be painted. Eritrea was now “the exploiter”, a bully that “coerced” Ethiopian authorities into unbalanced and unfair agreements”. The idea, apparently, was to teach Eritrea the lesson that (the old fallacy) its existence was irrevocably and forever tied to Ethiopia’s abundant resources; that what amounted to a trade embargo, would bring it down to submission.

The mood in Eritrea was different.

The old traditional trade ties with Ethiopia, which were re-enforced by the mutual friendship apparent at independence had, in a way, clouded Eritrea’s vision in many ways. So, the strain in trade relations following the Nakfa, though obviously lamentable, was a good thing, as it widened the nation’s perspective and alternatives. That was how the incident was assessed and explained to the Eritrean public.

F. Concluding points

In the areas of trade and currency policies, the post-1991 agreements between Eritrea and Ethiopia did not work and, in fact, led to some confrontations. In other areas, including the issue of citizenship, no insurmountable problems were encountered and, one may say, they were generally successful.

We now hear a lot of “learned analysis” surmising that the root cause of the border crisis of May 1998 is Eritrea ‘s “failed” economy; that “the Badme Incident” was a tactic by the Eritrean Government to divert its people from its internal problems….etc. These are all Ethiopian allegations, so often repeated and so made wide-spread through the relentless use of every media, propaganda and diplomatic resource at their disposal that they, initially, confused quite a few people.

The facts are different. The latest economic indicators issued by the independent studies of the IMF and the World Bank attest to the following:-

The IMF Executive Board, which met on July 13, 1998, issued its official findings on July 16, 1998. Here it expressed its concern over the border conflict but, otherwise, fully endorsed the Eritrean government’s policies and practices in every field of economic activity. Eritrea’s “impressive progress made in economic reconstruction and social rehabilitation during the past six years” was welcomed by the Directors. They also welcomed the “further progress” made in 1997 “particularly in implementing structural reforms, reducing the fiscal deficit and successfully introducing the Nakfa.” They also commended the “authorities92 strong commitment to strengthen macroeconomic performance and reform the institutional framework.” Looking ahead, the Directors saw the present conflict as an impediment to the Eritrean authorities92 plans of “further reducing macroeconomic imbalances and accelerating growth.” They also noted the adverse effects the conflict can play on the nation’s fiscal policy, in spite of “the commendable reduction of the budget deficit in 1997.” (IMF, No.98-277, July 16, 1998.)

The IMF further noted the boost that the private sector got through the privatization of 700 small-scale and 39 big and medium-scale manufacturing enterprises. It further stated, “Prices were decontrolled while differential interest rates between private and public sectors were eliminated.” Consequently, the IMF pointed out, “the role of the private sector was boosted, resulting in buoyant growth in manufacturing and services exports.”

With the benefit of these reforms, the report continued, “real output growth averaged 7 percent during 1993-96 and rose to 8 percent in 1997, translating into significant growth in per capita income”.

The report also found the annual inflation rate for 1993-96 to have been at less than 4 percent. The reduction of government expenditure by about 10 percentage points and the increase in revenues by 6 percentage points was also noted as a result of both “the completion of some programs and the intention of the authorities to bring down the deficit to sustainable levels “, and the “broadening of the tax base and the ongoing strengthening of the collection effort respectively”. As a result, “the deficit came down sharply from 16.4 percent in 1996 to 5.5 percent of GDP in 1997″. Finally, the report notes, “the medium-term targets of real output growth of 6-7 percent per annum, annual rate of 3-5 percent and a built-up of reserves to 5.5 months of imports are quite ambitious and consistent with the authorities92 track record of perseverance with implementation of good economic policies.”(IMF, BUFF/ED/98/105, July 10, 1998.)

The World Bank has more recently also given high marks to Eritrea’s implementation of programs and projects. Last August, the Bank’s representative for Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan declared that Eritrea was one of the five countries in the world with whom the World Bank maintains exemplary relations. Its “impressive economic performance”, the official also noted, “mainly emanates from its effective implementation of home-grown development strategies.” (Eritrea Profile, Vol.5 No.24, August 22, 1998.) The virtual absence of corruption in the country and the safety and stability prevalent even in spite of the border conflict are invariably mentioned as great assets for Eritrea’s future development.

There is, in short, no evidence whatsoever of the Ethiopian government’s continuous claim that the Eritrean economy is in dire straits. At the time of writing this paper, mid-August, 1998, the Nakfa stands at 7.45-7.50 to the US dollar, still maintaining its pre-conflict levels. At this particular time (August, 1998), the Ethiopian Birr’s position vis-à-vis the dollar is about the same. The price of fuel in Eritrea stays constant at 2.80 Nakfa per litre and bread is available at 0.20 cents Nakfa or about 0.03 cents US apiece, a price maintained since independence. Whereas it would be self-deceiving to claim that the conflict is not adversely affecting the Eritrean economy, the fact that it is still withstanding this adversity attests to its strong base.

Why, then, would a government that is doing so well on the economic, social and political fronts, want to start a border conflict and create problems for itself? Why would it want to dismantle all of its achievements of the past seven years?

The answer, definitely, lies somewhere else – on the border conflict that has its own background and history, not directly related to the cooperation agreements discussed above or to the performance of the Eritrean economy.

We now turn our attention to the events leading to the border conflict of May 6, 1998, where the real cause of the hostilities lie.

III. Events Leading to the May 6 Incident at Badme

1. Incidents and disputes along the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia are not a new phenomenon and they were never about the boundary. Like all colonial divides the boundary between Eritrea and Ethiopia is, at points, an arbitrary line that separated people who once lived together; people related by blood and intermarriage for whom international borders mean very little. 

   The nature of the conflicts in these areas, therefore, was never different from any similar conflicts within Tigrai or within Eritrea – for the population, that is. Problems usually arose when one coveted the others 92 grazing area or places of settlement. Thus one cannot accuse simple farmers of deliberately crossing boundaries to cause international conflicts and the same with those who rise to defend what they consider their own.

   Previous administrators on both sides of the border, even during the Italian and British periods in Eritrea, understood this very well and never gave more attention to land disputes around the border than they deserved. In the 1950′s, during the decade of the Ethio-Eritrean federation, the Ethiopian Ministry of Interior is known to have issued directives warning against alterations of the old Italian boundary lines as it thought such an act would give rise to serious complications.

   Border incidents, therefore, were seen as problems that required careful and proper handling, probably also ways of creating an atmosphere whereby both sides could develop disputed areas together. Upon Eritrean independence and the coming to power of the TPLF, there was every reason to believe that old border disputes would finally come to rest.

    

2. However, that is not what happened. Ever since its creation in the 1970′s, the TPLF had given to the border issue an attention that was not reciprocated by the EPLF. Whereas the TPLF invariably exacerbated existing border problems, EPLF people chose a different approach. They were of the opinion that border misunderstandings were not an urgent matter, that they could be deferred to the settlement of the whole issue at the state level. There was, however, no reciprocal disposition on the other side. 

   Thus, beginning in 1990, when the TPLF took over Tigrai, new conflict areas were added to the old ones. This is particularly true of the upper Indeli (a border-demarcating river), where bands armed by the TPLF invaded an Eritrean village inhabited by the unarmed Hazo. On this incident of 30 December, 1993, 32 Hazo houses were completely destroyed and the inhabitants driven out of their original habitat. Attempts at compensating the victims and resettling them, undertaken by joint efforts, were often frustrated by a lack of commitment of the TPLF and by the insistence of its members that the village invaded was Tigrayan and the rebuilding should take place on what they pointed out as Eritrean territory.

    

3. At this same time, the rumblings of a dispute were being heard from Badme. By now, everyone knows that the village of Badme forms a small part of the Badme Plains, through which the Ethio-Eritrean border crosses, joining the Tekezze-Setit river with the Mereb at Mai Anbessa. The town itself is on the north-eastern side of the border, secure in Eritrean territory. Decades ago, this wild country, a haven for wild animals, started to be settled by Eritreans descending from the highlands. These even crossed deep inside the Tigrai side to establish settlements. 

   Until the mid-1990′s, movement along this border was probably the freest as no cause ever arose for strict border controls. Eritrean administrators never doubted where the boundary lay, and always deferred that issue to the more formal demarcations expected to be effected by both governments. From 1993 onwards, however, some incidents started to take place and these caused a lot of concern for Eritrea.

   In 1992-93, Tigrayan authorities in the Lower Adiabo area, adjoining the Badme sections of Eritrea, started to talk about a demarcation line. Eritrean farmers who had lived in the area for decades were reporting that they were being penalized and their property confiscated for “illegal entry”.

    

4. On 20-21 July 1994, a high-level meeting was held between the EPLF and the TPLF, led by Secretary Alamin Mohammed Said and Politbureau member Tewelde Weldemariam, respectively. Regarding the border issue, they agreed:- 

    

   • that both parties should work towards the strengthening of the relationship between the people, officials of the two fronts and government administrators in the border areas; ways of solving minor misunderstandings existing in those areas were also to be found. 

      

   • that the disputes between neighbouring villages and people on both sides of the border were similar to those found within one country and, in order to solve the problems in conflict resolution seen amongst officials on both sides, the political activities of the fronts were to be strengthened and misunderstandings to be quickly avoided in the spirit of friendship 

      

   • cadres from both fronts in the border area were to meet every three months to discuss issues of common interest. 

    

5. The meetings foreseen by the above decision did not take place as soon as expected. Two meetings scheduled for first and 15th November 1994, the records show, had to be postponed because the Tigray side sent minor officials to meet with high-level delegates from Eritrea, and it often turned out that the former had no authority to decide even on minor matters. 

   In the meantime, 1995 saw the unabated continuation by the Tigrai authorities of the harassment of Eritrean farmers for “trespass” into unilaterally demarcated territory.

    

6. In 1996, TPLF officials intensified their campaign of harassment and expulsion of Eritreans from border villages. A few examples follow:- 

    

   • On June 7, 1996, 12 villagers of Adi Mahrai (Zibra) were taken into custody 

      

   • On July 19, six armed TPLF members entered Gheza Sherif, and demanded that 34 farmers leave the village. These had lived there for 15-20 years. When the farmers refused, a confrontation ensued and this was stopped by the intervention of the Eritrean administrators of the sub-region. 

      

   • On August 4, 1996, 16 armed TPLF soldiers again entered Gheza Sherif and demanded that all the inhabitants move out. When they refused, three “representatives” including a woman, were taken under custody. 

      

   • On 17 June, 1996, 24 farmers of Adi Mahrai (Zibra) were ordered not to work fields already plowed and cultivated, rendering 66 hectares of harvest totally out of use. 

      

   • At this same time, 29 farmers of Denbe Himbrty, were forced to leave their habitat by similar orders of TPLF armed administrators and militiamen. 

   A total of 18 items of similar acts of arbitrary expulsion and harassment are listed in the report of the rainy and cultivation season of 1996 alone.

    

7. When the destruction of houses and expulsion of Eritreans continued deep into the first quarter of 1997, a joint-meeting of high level administrative officials was held in Shire, Tigrai, with the aim of finding a temporary solution to the problem. This meeting, which was led by the Vice President of the Tigrai Region, Ato Tzegai Berhe and the Deputy Administrator of the Gash-Barka Region of Eritrea, Ato Tesfamichael G.Medhim lasted for two days, 20-21 April 1997, and included all the major officials of the corresponding border districts. 

   In this meeting, the Eritrean side expressed its opposition and misgivings about the series of unilateral demarcations effected by the Tigrai Administration inside Eritrean territory. It pointed out that these “demarcations” were neither known nor acceptable to the Eritrean government. It also demanded that the arbitrary expulsions of Eritrean nationals stop immediately. The Tigrai representatives insisted that the demarcations had been laid down in 1986-87, during the struggle, and that the EPLF had known about them. After a serious discussion and exchange of views, it was decided to set up a sub-committee from the adjacent districts to study the matter on the ground and to see if some intermediate solution could be found.

    

8. In accordance with the Shire decisions, the designated sub-committee met from 22-27 June, 1997 to make a tour of the “demarcations”, a length it determined at about 40 kms. At the preliminary meeting of the 22nd, the Tigrayan representatives argued that the purpose of the meeting and the tour was for the Eritrean side to visit and accept the line as demarcated by the Tigrayans. That, they said, was how they understood the Shire agreement. 

   The Eritreans rejected this. The purpose of the tour, they said, was for them to see the Tigrayan unilateral demarcation and compare it with what they believed to be Eritrean territory. They were not there to be told where their boundary lay. Although this disagreement threatened to disrupt the meeting the tour was made all the same.

   It was established then that, not just one, but a set of at least three demarcations, each creeping deeper into Eritrea had been laid on the ground. This was, naturally, highly objectionable to the Eritrean representatives.

   During the armed struggle, many EPLF fighters had seen or known about a the map of a larger Tigrai that included parts of Eritrean territory. It had been taken note of but, obviously, the more urgent matters of those days took precedence over raising it as a matter of contention. Since, after independence, the two governments were on very friendly terms, most of the border incidents were consistently being down-played by Eritrea, as the excesses of some border officials…. Now, the Badme demarcations started to bring the issue to the fore. As a border where Eritreans formed the clear majority on both sides for decades, movement had been fluid. For the Eritrean government or regional officials, the location of the border and what belonged to whom was never a question. Raising it as a point of difference, when such lofty objectives like breaking the trade barrier, creating the free trade area (FTA), moving towards economic harmonization…. were being discussed was simply seen as inappropriate and counter-productive. This is what all the directives and internal Eritrean circulars show.

   The Badme demarcations and the Tigrayan insistence that that was the border, however, sent an ominous warning to the Eritrean side. The Eritrean sub-committee consequently suggested that since matters affecting the border should not be decided by border and district officials, the issue be very seriously taken up and quickly settled at central government levels. It also advised and demanded that the Tigrayan side stop any further moves at harassing and expelling Eritreans.

   The Tigrayan sub-committee in its response demanded that no armed Eritrean enter the line of demarcation. In addition, it ordered that no Eritrean farmer was to plough fields or build houses or sheds beyond the line and that the inhabitants of two villages, Gheza Sherif and Enda Tchi 92a, were to be evacuated.

   All the elements of a border conflict were, thus, put in place.

    

9. By July, 1997, the harassment of Eritrean inhabitants in the whole “unilaterally demarcated” areas was intensifying. The exchange of letters between the Eritrean administrator of the Shambuko sub-region and his counterparts in Sheraro, Tigrai, tell an interesting story. One of these, written by the Eritrean administrator on July 16, 1997, appeals for restraint on the part of Tigrayan authorities and police, as tensions were running high amongst the inhabitants from what they saw as unwarranted expulsions from land they had developed over lifetimes. He calls on the Tigrayans to “observe maximum care and to wait for the meeting of a higher-level committee so that the situation does not go out of control.” 

   The July 17 reply of the Tigrayan counterpart was to warn the Eritrean administrator that in the event of any worsening of the situation, he would be held responsible, since, as he put it, “the incursions into our demarcated territory are being carried out with your full knowledge.”

    

10. On 18-19 July 1997, three truckloads of Ethiopian troops entered the Badme area and planted radio communications equipment. Toyota pick-ups were also reported to be bringing in light and medium arms. Eritrean territory inside the “unilaterally demarcated” area was, thus, put under patrol. 

    On the following week, 26-27 July 1997, 15 Eritrean families that had lived in Gheza Sherif for at least 30 years each were evacuated and sent across what the TPLF now determined was the new Ethio-Eritrean border. 11 wells belonging to the village were destroyed. The same day, 30 families were evacuated from Enda Tchi 92a – their doors were broken, their silos destroyed and their cultivated fields uprooted and opened up for grazing.

    Document No. 62 01/90 of 21/8/1997 (or 16/12/1989 Ethiopian calendar), written by a Tigrayan police chief of the border sub-district refers to the campaigns of 11, 19 and 20 July. Here, he gives the following figures as the result of the campaign of the said dates:-

    The officer further indicates that a total of 755 campaigners, that is, Tigrayan soldiers, members of the police force, militiamen and farmers participated in the operation. “We only have ten trespassers on the Deda side still at large,” he concludes “In other areas, no person or crop has been spared. Our mission has been accomplished.”

    The Case of Adi Murug

     

11. The date of 19 July, 1997 ought to be noted as very significant. On this same day of the arrival of Tigrayan troops into Badme and their subsequent massive expulsion of Eritreans, a potentially more dangerous situation was developing at Adi Murug (Bada), at the northern tip of the former Denkalia, but now within the North Red Sea Region of Eritrea. 

    Historically, Adi Murug has figured as the fourth village of the Bada district – Boleli, Li 92en and Irimali are the three remaining and there was an Eritrean administrative unit at Adi Murug. Prior to July 19, Ethiopian administrators from the Afar Kelil had asked permission to assemble the inhabitants of Adi Murug for various purposes, but the Eritrean administrators had turned them back since the matters they wanted to discuss did not concern the inhabitants of Adi Murug.

    On July 19, two battalions of the Ethiopian army came to Adi Murug and its commander met with representatives of the Eritrean army in the area. The Ethiopians explained that they were there to chase armed Ethiopian opposition elements whom they believed to be in the Bada area, and requested entry. The battalions were let in on this understanding.

    Five days later, July 24, Ethiopian administrators from the Afar Kelil moved into Adi Murug and instructed the Eritrean Administrators to disband – they were taking over. The Eritreans resisted, but on July 28, at a meeting of the whole Adi Murug inhabitants, the Ethiopians declared Adi Murug Ethiopian territory and appointed their own administrative committee. The inhabitants 92 objections that they were Eritrean citizens with proper ID cards and that they had known Adi Murug as Eritrean territory did not matter.

    The Eritrean military commander tried to reason with his Ethiopian counter-part, but to no avail. To the argument that border matters ought to be referred to the central government and not be handled so high-handedly, the Ethiopians replied that the Afar and Tigrai Kelils had declared Adi Murug Ethiopian territory and there was nothing they could do to change the decision. That the Adi Murug and Badme incidents fell on the same day or week cannot be a coincidence and it certainly was not. Something was cooking in the minds of the TPLF leadership. This could no longer be downplayed as the excesses of ambitious or troublesome border officials. Although, as a trend, it had been there, it was suddenly assuming a character that needed urgent attention.

     

12. On 8 August 1997, about three weeks after the Adi Murug and Badme incidents, Secretary Alamin Mohammed Said and Political Affairs Head Yemane Ghebreab of the PFDJ travelled to Addis Ababa to discuss the matter with Tewolde Welde- mariam of the TPLF (EPRDF). Here, they tried to impress upon the other side that what was happening at Adi Murug and in Badme was inconsistent with the friendly relationship between the two sides. They argued that using force to create facts on the ground was not acceptable. They also asked that the Ethiopian government reverse the steps it had taken. Any outstanding matters, they maintained, could be handled in a spirit of understanding and taking the welfare of the border population into consideration 

    Mr. Tewolde’s answer at the time was to flatly claim Adi Murug as Ethiopian territory. On Badme, he alleged that the source of the problem were Eritrean Administrators who were continuously instigating their farmers to cross demarcated lines. He further refused to accept Eritrea’s suggestion that steps taken by the Ethiopian authorities be reversed.

     

13. Less than a month after the Adi Murug and Badme incidents of July 19, Eritrea’s President Isaias Afeworki wrote the following letter to Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia on August 16, 1997:-* 
    

    Comrade Meles;

    Greetings.

    I am being compelled to write you to day because of the preoccupying situation prevailing in the areas around Bada.

    It cannot be said that the border between our two countries is demarcated clearly although it is known traditionally. And we had not given the issue much attention in view of our present and future ties. Moreover, I do not believe that this will be a cause of much concern and controversy even in the future.

    Be this as it may, there have been intermittent disputes in the border areas arising form different and minor causes. Local officials have been striving to defuse and solve these problems amicably. However, the forcible occupation of Adi-Murug by your army in the past few days is truly saddening.

    There was no justification for resorting to force as it would not have been at all difficult to settle the matter amicably even if it was deemed important and warranting immediate attention. It would also be possible to quietly and without haste demarcate the boundaries in case this is felt to be necessary.

    I, therefore, urge you to personally take the necessary prudent action so that the measure that has been taken will not trigger unnecessary conflict.

    Best Regards

    Your comrade

    Isaias Afwerki

    16/08/97

    Prime Minister Meles’s undated terse reply came subsequently. It read as follows:

    Comrade Isaias,

    Greetings.

    I have seen the letter you sent me. I had also heard that the situation in the border areas does not look good. I was also informed that the matter was discussed between your colleague (Yemane), who had come here, and ours (Tewolde). We did not imagine that what happened in Bada could create problems. This is because the areas our comrades are controlling were not controversial before and we believed that prior consultation was only necessary for disputed areas. We moved to the areas to pursue the remnants of Ougugume (Afar Opposition) who were obstructing our peace efforts from positions there. We believe we can ease the tension concerning the borders on the basis of the understanding reached previously between your team and our colleague (Tewolde). Perhaps, it is also necessary to settle the border demarcation issue after the necessary preparations are carried out by both sides.

    In the meantime, the situation was worsening in Badme and President Isaias felt obliged to, once more, write to Prime Minister Meles on 25 August 1997:-

    Comrade Meles,

    Greetings.

    Regarding the situation in the border areas, my information establishes that the measures taken at Adi-Murug were not in areas that are undisputed but in our own areas and by expelling our officials and dismantling the existing administration. Concerning the Ougugume, your action (in Adi-Murug) came as our Defence was preparing to co-operate on the basis of the request from your Army. Moreover, similar measures have been taken in the Badme area.

    I had indicated to you, these measures are unjustified. In order to expediently check any further deterioration and pave the way for a final solution, we have assigned on our part three officials (Defence Minister Sebhat Ephrem; PFDJ Head of Political Affairs, Yemane Ghebreab; and National Security Advisor, Abraha Kassa) I suggest that you also similarly (or in ways you think best) assign officials so that both sides can meet as soon as possible to look into these matters. I await your thoughts.

    Best regards

    Your Comrade

    Isaias Afewerki

    25/08/97

     

14. In accordance with President Isaias 92 suggestion, the Joint Border Commission was set up – the Eritrean side to be led by General Sebhat Efrem, Minister of Defence. The first meeting was scheduled for November, 1997. 

    Before this took place, the October 17 (12 October, 1990 Ethiopian calendar) issue of the TPLF magazine Weyin, printed the new map of the Tigrai Kelil. The official map of the Kelil, showing a much more enlarged Tigrai – from large expanses carved out of Begemider, Wollo and Eritrea – was also printed by the Ethiopian Mapping Authority. Here, the straight line linking the Tekezze-Setit with the Mereb at Mai Anbessa had disappeared and was replaced by an oblique line entering deep into Eritrean territory. Not only the “demarcated” area that was causing concern, but large chunks of other Eritrean land had been included. Besides this, Eritrean territory like Alitena, Bada and areas south of Tzerona were also demarcated as Ethiopian domain. The old colonial borders of Eritrea had been changed by the unilateral actions of the TPLF government.

     

15. In November, 1997, the Joint High Commission met in Asmara and agreed to meet again within three months. There was no discussion on substantive matters. In the meantime, in January 1998, Ethiopian troops were deployed to the border on the Assab line to demand that the Eritrean border post situated on the Assab-Addis Ababa road move several kilometres towards Assab, as the area was being claimed by Ethiopia. A patient handling and quiet diplomacy on the part of Eritrea averted a what could have been a dangerous confrontation. 

     

16. When all this was happening, tension was building up in and around Badme. Land confiscated from Eritreans evacuated from the unilaterally demarcated areas was being re-allocated to Tigrayan farmers who moved into the area. A letter by the Administrator of Tahtai Adyabo, Ato Abraha Berhane, written on March 10, 1998, clearly indicates that that practice was government policy and was to be encouraged. By May 1998, tensions had run quite high. 

    On May 6, 1998, Ethiopian troops fired on an Eritrean platoon on routine duty along the border around Badme. Several of its members were killed. This triggered off a chain reaction on both sides that culminated in the May 13, 1998 declaration of war by the Ethiopian Parliament.

    The Eritrean Government has already invited neutral parties to examine the circumstances that led to the incident of May 6. That is, of course, meant to determine who made the first move as far as the armed clashes of that date is concerned. As this paper has attempted to show, however, all the elements of the conflict had been put in place by the TPLF’s continuous and provocative incursions into Eritrean territory and its cadres 92 willful harassment of Eritrean inhabitants of the border areas.

     

17. As suggested in the introduction to this paper, the border issue had nothing to do with the post 1991 cooperation agreements between the two sides. The trend that this problem had been following has its own origin and runs way back to the time when the TPLF was still in the process of formation. 

The genesis and development of the border conflict being what it is, nothing can explain the Ethiopian military build-up at Zalambessa, the Assab border and elsewhere along the boundary when the area of conflict, according to the Ethiopian Parliament’s decision and subsequent declarations by Ethiopian officials, is Badme. Nothing can ever justify the hate-campaign against Eritrea and Eritreans immediately launched by the Ethiopian government. Nor can the Ethiopian boycott of Assab and Massawa port facilities, the cancellation of Ethiopian Airlines flights, the bombing of Asmara on June 5, and, worst of all, the expulsion of thousands of Eritreans from Ethiopia ever be rationalized.

The border conflict is senseless and neither party is likely to gain from its continuation. It has its roots in the TPLF’s persistent incursions into Eritrean territory, an act that can only be explained in terms of the expansionist tendencies of that Front’s leadership.

The chance for peace lies in the immediate cessation of hostilities, direct talks, demilitarization, demarcation of the whole border in accordance with existing international treaties and, as a final resort, adjudication by international courts. War will only further complicate a simple problem.

 
- (dehai.org)

Eritrea’s Brief History:

Italian Ambitions for an Empire in Eritrea
Federation with Ethiopia
Eritreans Begin Fight for Independence
Provisional Government in Eritrea
Eritrea Journey of nation-building
Eritrean immigrants
The 9 tribes of Eritrea
Religion in Eritrea

Eritrean Interview with former EPLF fighter about the vision, goal and life during the independence struggle against Ethiopia in Ginbar Nacfa. More videos of Eri-TV @ www.eritrea-chat.com or www.youtube.com/eritreachat.

Eritrean History: The nine ethnic groups of the country provide Eritrea with a variety of lifestyles and cultures. The sea is central to the people of the coast, while the lowlanders’ lives are oriented around camels, and the farming communities of the central highlands gear their lives to the constant passing of the seasons. Style of dress, customs, decoration and art all reflect these variations.

Eritrea’s craft objects are not manufactured for the tourist market alone but from a part of the daily lives of the local people. Every thing that we see as an art form is, in fact, a functional item for every day use. Leather work such as jackets, shoes (sandals, loafers and elegant dress shoes), gold and silver-smiths and handcraft items such as clay coffeepots, hand made ropes, charcoal braziers, baskets and cosmetic containers are some of the many locally made souvenirs.

Eritrean basketwork differs from its worldwide counterparts in that the baskets are used not only to carry goods but also in the preparation and serving of food. The baskets available in the markets vary in size and design and in the hues used to decorate them. In fact, the basket-makers of Eritrea have a full-time job weaving their wares of sale as food covering, jewelry boxes, breakfast plates, bread baskets, table mats, laundry baskets, coarse sieves and wall decorations.

A lot of pottery in Eritrea is fired in very basic kilns. Coffee pots with slender necks, brightly painted holders for incense sticks and various-sized bowls for food which can also double up as plant pots are the usual items in general use. Water containers of different sizes are also popular.

Gold and silver body-ornamentation has a rich history in Eritrea. Finely-worked earrings, necklaces, bracelets and rings in both precious metals are sold in the numerous jewelry shops, as are the famous Christian crosses, which are also available in brass. With precious metals being rare, unavailable or unaffordable in the rural areas, women in the rural areas usually wear jewelry made from many varieties of beads, strung together and worn around their heads, necks, wrists and ankles.

Source: Tourism Information Booklet 2013

by Yishak Yared,

Asked about what it would take for the total liberation of Eritrea after the decisive Fenkil offensive and the annihilation of the enemy from the Port city of Massawa, President Isaias Afwerki, then Secretary General of the EPLF, said that “Victory would be a matter of months”. By all means of calculation and the damage inflicted upon the enemy forces during the consecutive offensives of the liberation fighter it had been inevitable that the enemy had no power or the will to resist the advance of the EPLF fighters.

The Derg regime with heavy assistance by the then superpower, the Soviet Union, had been able to launch eight major offensives, between 1978 and 1986, to crush the Eritrean revolution once and for all.

The much anticipated offensive on the part of the Derg regime had been that of the sixth offensive, in their term the “Red Star”. Within more than two years of preparation to conduct the operation the regime fielded more than 90,000 troops, sophisticated heavy weaponry, modern fighter jets and above all direct military advice from Soviet generals. Thus the sixth offensive was launched on 15 February 1982.

This huge offensive had been crushed by the gallant liberation fighters and with that the morale and apatite of the enemy to continue fighting had been totally collapsed. On the contrary, the morale of the liberation fighters reached to its highest stage. Every one had been convinced that from this day on no force would stand to confront the advance of the revolution to route out the enemy from the country and liberate the nation. The offensives that came after the huge sixth offensive were only desperate actions on the part of the Dreg regime in an attempt to try to reverse the situation if possible. However, they were to no avail and only to receive more heavy blows and causing more deaths of its soldiers and loosing more weaponry.

After the end of the eight successive failed offensives of the Derg the EPLF leadership had been convinced that from this onward it would be the turn of the revolution to take measures in its own hands and initiate operations its own where and when deemed necessary.

One of the first offensives initiated by the EPLF forces has been the renowned operation for the demise of Nadew Iz. The Command had fortified its tranches in the front for solid ten years without doing any thing to fulfill its mission and finally to be demolished itself at the hands of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Army on March 17, 1988. The enemy had strong confidence on the command that it was capable to destroy the liberation forces and take over its Nakfa stronghold. But to its surprise it has been unhilated in a matter of few days.

From this decisive operation the EPLF captured and armed itself with BM rocket launchers, 13 mm guns and other heavy and light ammunitions and vehicles. Thousands of Ethiopian soldiers including three Soviet military advisors were taken prisoners.

The victory at Afabet further solidified the power of the EPLF both in weaponry and morale of its fighters. The operation had taken the world by surprise and the major media outlets of the world began to talk about the operation in particular and the struggle for Eritrean independence in general. With this operation the Derge regime was defeated both militarily and diplomatically for the EPLF became a head line in many media and international forums.

The Demise of Nadew Iz has been the turning point in the armed struggle for Eritrean independence and it has been a matter of time that the sooner Eritrea and its people would be free from the yokes of colonialism and the enemy routed out from the country once and for all.